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1. Introduction 
There will come seven years of great plenty throughout all 
the land of Egypt, but after them there will arise seven years 
of famine, and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of 
Egypt; the famine will consume the land, and the plenty will 
be unknown in the land by reason of that famine which will 
follow, for it will be very grievous.   
(Genesis 41, 29:31) 
 
The Irish economy is currently in its seventh consecutive 
year of historically high economic growth, a growth pattern that 
is expected to be maintained in the medium term. Recent years 
have also seen the General Government balance move into 
surplus. Demographic projections, that are critical both to long-
term economic growth and fiscal prospects, indicate an 
improvement in the dependency ratio up to 2006 and no marked 
disimprovement in that ratio until about the  year 2026. It is 
within this context that fiscal sustainability issues in Ireland are 
being debated, an environment that might be considered quite 
favourable in an European context.  
A not unreasonable “base case” scenario, outlined in 
detail in section 2, suggests that demographic developments are 
unlikely to threaten fiscal sustainability in Ireland in the years 
ahead. Indeed, the debt ratio, the conventional indicator of fiscal 
sustainability, is forecast to decline to a zero level by about 2020 
and to be still at a very low level by 2050. It is argued in the 
paper that favourable macroeconomic and fiscal prospects 
provide, in many ways, no less difficult challenges for public 
finance management than dealing with poor baseline prospects. 
In section 3, two long-term policy options with direct impact on 
the public finances are discussed. The first option - reducing the 
debt  - raises important issues for government and has 
implications for the financial and monetary system that need 
careful consideration. The second option  - prefunding future 
pension liabilities  - also raises important issues, not least that 
member states face a disincentive under EU fiscal rules to 
initiating prefunding schemes. In section 4, the dynamics of 
fiscal sustainability in a fast-growing economy such as Ireland 
are considered. It is argued that the EU fiscal rules may 
unnecessarily restrict government investment and may   2
consequently have a negative impact on long-term 
macroeconomic and fiscal prospects. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Irish Economic and Fiscal Performance in the Long Run 
2.1 Macroeconomic and Fiscal Performance in the 1990s 
and to 2002  
In Table 1, data are provided that summarise Irish 
economic performance over the last ten years and prospects for 
the medium-term.  The GDP growth rate data illustrate that the 
Irish economy is forecast to experience its seventh consecutive 
year of historically high growth in 2000. There has been a 
parallel improvement in the general government balance in recent 
years with a surplus having been recorded in each of the years 
since 1997. The debt-to-GDP ratio has also decreased 
significantly in recent years, as can be seen in column (c) of 
Table 1.  
The 1999  Stability Programme Update for Ireland 
contains macroeconomic and fiscal projections for Ireland for 
the period 2000 to 2002. It forecasts average GDP growth of 
6.5 per cent. per annum over the period and an average budget 
surplus (excluding prefunding and once-off costs) of 3 per cent. 
per annum.
1 
                                                                 
1   Official projections of the General Government Surplus and GDP growth 
have proven in recent years to have been too pessimistic.   For example, in 
the Ireland - Stability Programme 1999 to 2001 (2 December 1998) the 
General Government Surplus for 1999 was 1.7 per cent.   The outturn in 
1999, excluding prefunding initiatives, was much higher at 3.9 per cent. due 
to a considerably higher tax take than expected.   Similarly, for 2000 there 
are already indications of tax revenue being considerably higher than 
projected in the Stability Programme Update.    3
Table 1.  Summary of Irish Macroeconomic and Fiscal 
Data 1991-2002 
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*The general government data for 1991 to 1999 is measured on an 
ESA79 basis and for 2000 to 2002 on an ESA95 basis. The 1999 to 
2002 general government balance data excludes the impact of 
prefunding costs initiated in the 2000 Budget. 
Sources
: 
(a): 1991-1998: 1999 National Income and Expenditure 
(Central Statistics Office); 1999:  Quarterly Bulletin  - 
Spring 2000 (Central Bank of Ireland); 2000-2002: Ireland 
- Stability Programme December 1999 Update 
(Department of Finance). (b) & (c): 1991-1999 (ESA79): 
Excessive Deficit Procedure Notifications to the European 
Commission and Department of Finance; 2000-2002 
(ESA95): Ireland - Stability Programme December 1999 
Update (Department of Finance). 
2.2 A Long Run Projection of Fiscal Variables in Ireland in 
the 21st Century 
While the medium-term prospects for the Irish public 
finances appear quite good, the question naturally arises as to 
how they will develop in the longer-term. In recent years, the 
Irish Department of Finance established a Long-Term Issues 
Group (LTIG) to assess the budgetary implications of potential 
developments over the period up to 2050. Its assessment, 
published in the Long-Term Issues Group Paper (1999), 
provided the background to the recent decision by the Irish   4
government to put aside, with effect from 1999, 1 per cent. of 
GNP for the prefunding of future public service and social 




The LTIG utilised the Actuarial Review of Pensions as 
the source of long-term demographic trends in Ireland. In Table 
2, some of the key projections for the years up to 2056 are 
provided. The total population is projected to increase up to the 
year 2026 and to decline relatively slowly thereafter. The 
working age group will increase by 16 per cent. in the years up 
to 2016 but will fall below 1996 levels by 2056. The over 65 
group will more than double by 2036 and will continue to 
increase up to 2056.  The proportion of the population of 
working age (20-64 years) is projected to increase from 56 per 
cent. in 1996 to 60 per cent. in 2006, to decrease slowly up to 
2036 to 56 per cent. and fall somewhat faster thereafter to 51 per 
cent. in 2056. Although the proportion of the population aged 65 
and over is projected to increase over the whole period and 
markedly so after 2016, the old age dependency ratio will remain 
in the low to mid 20 percentage points range up to 2016. It will 
rise sharply thereafter, reaching a level of 53 per cent. by 2056. 
The overall dependency ratio (old age dependants and those in 
the 0-19 years groups to the working age group) is expected to 
fall over the period up to 2006 but to rise steadily thereafter to 
95 per cent. in 2056. 
 
Table 2.  Long-Term Demographic Projections for Ireland 













  (000’s)  (000’s)  (000’s)  (%)  (%) 
           
1996  3,626  2,013  411  21  80 
2006  3,832  2,294  453  20  67 
2016  4,012  2,351  584  25  71 
2026  4,089  2,331  759  33  75 
2036  4,071  2,263  908  40  80 
2046  3,949  2,073  1,020  49  90 
2056  3,730  1,911  1,018  53  95 
             5
Source: LTIG (1999). 
 
The Base Case Scenario 
 
Given this demographic profile, the LTIG prepared a 
“base case scenario” for the period 2000 to 2050 setting out a 
potential path for the economy and the government budget by 
taking into account both the demographic projections outlined 
above and a series of macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions. 
A principal assumption underlying the base case is that 
the rate of economic growth will average 6 per cent. from 1998 
to 2000, 5 per cent. from 2001 to 2006, 4 per cent. from 2007 to 
2010, 3.5 per cent. from 2011 to 2014 and 2 per cent. thereafter 
(inflation is assumed to average 2 per cent. over the period). 
This “unwinding” of the growth rate pattern in Ireland over the 
next fifteen years or so has also been suggested recently in a 
detailed analysis of prospects for the Irish economy by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (Duffy et al., 1999).
2    
Assumptions relating to government expenditure and 
government revenue are also outlined in the report. Among the 
critical assumptions made is that trends over the last decade in 
pay-related social insurance receipts relative to GNP continue 
over the period. On the expenditure side, pension rates are 
assumed to rise by 2 per cent. per annum above inflation and 
pay-related social insurance rates are also assumed to continue 
to reflect current arrangements. Both old age pensions and child 
benefit outlay projections are based on an annual real increase of 
1 per cent. per annum and on pensioner and children numbers 
from the Actuarial Review of Social Welfare Pensions. The 
capital expenditure projections assume that spending in this area 
is maintained at 4.5 per cent. of GNP over the period. Finally, a 
contingency provision rising to 2.4 per cent. of GNP by 2003, 
and maintained at that level in subsequent years, is assumed in 
respect of the possibility of adverse developments in economic 
activity or changes in taxation and/or expenditure arising in the 
future. 
                                                                 
2   The positive impact that demographic developments is expected to have on 
future Irish growth patterns is likely to be added to by continued 
improvements in educational attainment and an increase in the rate of female 
participation in the labour force.   6
Given these various assumptions, the resultant projected 
paths for both the Exchequer balance and the National Debt are 
outlined in F igure 1.
3 An Exchequer surplus would be 
maintained for about 30 years after which a deficit would emerge 
- this deficit would rise to 2.3 per cent. of GNP by 2050. The 
debt would be eliminated in about 20 years. It is assumed by the 
LTIG in the base case scenario that in the following years the 
State will use budget surpluses to increase its cash balances, i.e. 
it will take a “negative debt” position. This negative debt 
position will peak at 14 per cent. of GNP by 2030. Beyond this 
date, as the Exchequer balance moves into deficit, the negative 
debt will be unwound and the debt will rise to about 11 per cent. 




The base case scenario indicates that the continuation of 
a pay-as-you-go approach in state pensions would not place a 
particularly great burden on the Exchequer within the 50-year 
horizon considered. Any exercise in assessing long-term 
sustainability, however, should look at the sensitivity of the 
underlying assumptions to unfavourable developments. One 
scenario that dramatically illustrates how the public finances in 
Ireland could deteriorate is where annual GNP growth is 
assumed to be 1 percentage point lower than in the base case. In 
particular, with its total trade with the rest of the world 
amounting to almost 200 per cent. of GNP and its small size in 
an international context, the impact of an external shock on the 
Irish economy could be severe. Duffy et al. (1999, chapter 6) 
argue that a sudden shock to the US economy from collapsing 
equity prices, or a monetary policy shock to the EU economy, 
could give rise to a 3 percentage points or more decline in Irish 
GNP growth for a limited period. 
                                                                 
3   The data are Exchequer-based. The Exchequer balance is cash-accounting 
based and covers the balance between the expenditure and receipts of 
central government only. The debt projections, likewise, relate to central 
government debt. The focus on Exchequer data, however, provides a fairly 
comprehensive view of the evolution of the public finances in Ireland because 
of the centralised nature of government in Ireland.  The 1999 Exchequer 
balance was a surplus of  2 per cent. of GNP.   7
The lower growth rate scenario results in the surplus 
quickly deteriorating into deficits by 2010 and ending up at 36 
per cent. of GNP by 2050, if no policy action was taken in the 
interim, see Figure 2. The debt would also become 
unsustainable rising to 455 per cent. of GNP by the end of the 
period.  
 
Setting Aside 1 per cent. of GNP for Prefunding Purposes 
 
The long run impact of a partial prefunding arrangement 
of setting aside one per cent. of GNP per annum for prefunding 
purposes on the Exchequer balance and debt was considered by 
the LTIG. The LTIG simulation is particularly interesting given 
the decision by the Irish government on 1 December 1999 to 
provide pre-funding of 1 per cent. of GNP per annum with 
effect from 1999 (discussed in detail in section 3).  
In the LTIG study, the funding commitment is assumed 
to take place up to 2020 and to involve an annual allocation from 
the Exchequer to the fund of 1 per cent. of GNP that is invested 
at a rate of return one percentage point. higher than the interest 
rate on the national debt. The Fund would then be progressively 
run down to zero between 2021 and 2050.  
The initial impact of setting up the Fund in comparison 
to the base case assumed by the LTIG would be a smaller 
reduction in the national debt. The Fund grows to 26 per cent. 
of GNP in 2020. The Fund has the effect of lowering the range 
of the Exchequer balance over the period. The budget deficit is 
1.5 per cent. of GNP in 2050 compared to 2.3 per cent. in the 
base case without the Fund, see Figure 3a, while the debt ratio is 
down to 1 per cent. compared to being higher at 11 per cent. at 
that time in the base case, see Figure 3b. 
3. Long Term Fiscal Policy Issues in Ireland 
While the outcome of the lower-GNP sensitivity scenario 
in the LTIG paper is not realistic since policy would have to 
react to pre-empt the implied ruinous outcomes, it demonstrates 
that in the current benign macroeconomic conditions prudent 
fiscal decision-making remains vital. Since 1997, the General 
Government balance in Ireland has been in surplus and the   8
Stability Programme Update for Ireland indicates that before any 
pre-funding initiatives are considered an average yearly surplus 
of 3 per cent. is expected for the period 1999-2002. The review 
of recent and prospective future economic and fiscal 
developments in Ireland in section 2 indicates that the “baseline” 
prospects for Ireland on fiscal sustainability appear quite 
favourable,   9
Figure 1 
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Source: LTIG (1999).   10
Figure 2 
Figure 2a: Budget Balance as % of GNP under the Base Case and a 1 
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Figure 2b: National Debt as % of GNP under the Base Case and 1 
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Figure 3 
Figure 3a: Budget Balance as % of GNP in Base Case with and without 
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Figure 3b: National Debt as % of GNP in Base Case with and without 
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Source: LTIG (1999). 
with the LTIG assessment pointing to budget surpluses being in 
prospect up to 2030.  
In this context, the natural question that arises for any 
country with favourable growth and fiscal prospects is: how 
best can the favourable fiscal position be best managed or 
utilised? In this section, there is a focus on policy alternatives 
that will have a direct impact on the evolution of the government 
budget balance and government debt over time. Two particular 
policy options are considered: using prospective fiscal surpluses 
solely to reduce government debt, and initiating a partial 
prefunding of future pension commitments of the government.   12
In section 4, consideration is given to how budgetary policy, in 
particular government investment policy, could enhance long-
term growth prospects in a fast-growing, catching-up economy 
such as Ireland and in so doing have, in turn, a positive impact 
on future fiscal outturns.   
3.1 Reducing the Government Debt 
In the period 1994 to 1999 the General Government 
debt-to-GDP ratio in Ireland almost halved from 86 per cent. to 
47 per cent. (in ESA79 terms). The debt-to-GDP ratio is 
expected to decline further to 36 per cent. (in ESA95 terms) by 
2002, according to the Stability Programme Update. Although a 
regular pre-funding contribution is being made in 1999 and 
subsequent years and government investment has also increased 
considerably in recent years, fiscal surpluses and a decline in the 
absolute level of the debt is projected in the years 2000 to 2002. 
Beyond that period, the LTIG “baseline” projections suggest 
that continuing surpluses and strong, if slowing, economic 
growth would lead to the absolute and relative level of debt 
continuing to fall well into the 21st century.  
While the prospect of a falling government debt would 
seem to be a welcome and enviable situation for any government 
to be faced with, it nevertheless raises a number of issues for 
consideration by government. It also raises some practical 
difficulties for central banks in conducting monetary policy 
operations and could also have implications for financial 
management more generally. The specific difficulties for 
government and for the monetary/financial system are addressed 
separately below. 
 
Issues for Government 
 
The reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio to a level of 52 
per cent. (ESA95 basis) by end-1999 means that the Irish debt 
ratio is within the 60 per cent. Maastricht Treaty reference value. 
As Balassone and Monacelli (2000) illustrate, however, member 
states (even those attaining balanced structural budget positions) 
whose debt-to-GDP ratios remain close to the 60 per cent. level 
may need in a cyclical downturn to pursue procyclical fiscal 
policies to ensure that their debt levels do not rise and violate the 
Treaty’s debt rule. Lane (1999) argues that given its greater   13
vulnerability to external shocks the Irish fiscal authorities should 
strive for a below-average debt ratio relative to other countries. 
These arguments suggest that as a starting point in examining 
longer-term fiscal policy options a further reduction in the debt-
to-GDP ratio through running fiscal surpluses should not be 
neglected. Focussing on maintaining fiscal surpluses over the 
medium-term not only helps to reduce the debt but may also 
have the benefit in an economy such as Ireland, where a positive 
output gap appears to exist at the moment, of acting to damp 
domestic demand and inflationary pressures.   
Against this, fiscal surpluses generate demands for 
increased government expenditure and tax reductions which if 
successful would add to overheating pressures. It is possible 
that private sector behaviour will be influenced by a commitment 
to a continued debt reduction strategy. For  instance, the 
personal savings ratio in Ireland seems to have declined in recent 
years at least in part it seems due to the government having 
become a net saver (Central Bank of Ireland, 1999, pp.31-32). 
Duffy et al (1999, p.98) expect the personal savings ratio to 
continue to decline in the medium-term  “because of the 
considerable improvement in the state of the public finances 
which means that the household sector can afford to consume 
today, safe in the knowledge that tax rates and government 
borrowings are unlikely to rise rapidly in the medium-term”.  
Combined with a buoyant economic environment, a 
continued reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio effecting a lower 
private savings ratio might have two significant implications for 
private sector behaviour and the economy more generally. First, 
a lower rate of savings has as its corollary a higher rate of 
current spending by the private sector. Such an increase in the 
rate of spending could add to any overheating pressures that 
exist in the economy. Secondly, l ower or declining savings 
could also increase the net borrowing position of the Irish 
household sector that emerged in the late 1990s, leaving that 
sector more exposed to increases in interest rates or adverse 
economic developments.        
 
Issues for Monetary Policy and the Financial System 
              14
Government securities have traditionally played an 
integral role in the operation of monetary policy. Open market 
operations involve the buying and selling of government 
securities and derivatives of those securities. Government bond 
markets, through their large size and diverse maturity spectrum, 
also facilitate a smooth monetary policy signalling process. 
Government securities also have an importance in 
financial markets more generally. Since they have little or no 
credit risk, government security prices provide a benchmark 
against which the prices of private securities and derivatives can 
be ascertained or based. Their comparatively low credit and 
liquidity risk also means that government securities are often 
seen as essential to reducing the overall risk of private asset 
portfolios. Furthermore, government debt is also often required 
as preferred or required capital backing for banks and private 
pension funds. 
A falling level of debt has implications for these areas of 
monetary and financial management. For the banking and 
pension fund industries, it means that there is less government 
debt available for holding for hedging or prudential needs. The 
reduction in the overall size of the bond market and the prospect 
of lower or even negative gross and net issuance of bonds could 
impair the government bond market’s ability to facilitate smooth 
signalling within financial markets in general and by the monetary 
authority in particular.       
With government deficit levels in the European Union 
having decreased to low levels in recent years and with seven 
EU member states expecting to have government balances in 
surplus by 2002,
4 the implications of falling debt levels for 
monetary policy and financial security could soon emerge as an 
important issue in Europe. Given the difficulties that falling debt 
might pose in this area, governments might have to consider 
maintaining a minimum level of gross debt to facilitate the 
smooth operation of financial markets and monetary policy 
(OECD, 1999).
5 This might suggest that EU governments faced 
                                                                 
4    According to the Stability Programme Updates and Convergence 
Programme Updates. 
5   See OECD (1999) and the Gensler, Bennett et al, and Fleming papers in 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2000) for a detailed discussion of the 
difficulties and possible solutions in this area.   15
with the prospect of budget surpluses might need to consider 
alternatives to using them solely to reduce gross government 
debt.  
3.2 The Establishment of Pension Funds 
 
One alternative to reducing the government debt alone as 
a long-term fiscal strategy in favourable circumstances is to 
initiate a policy of prefunding future government pension 
outlays. The adoption of a policy of partial prefunding was 
announced by the Irish government in 1999. In this sub-section, 
the proposed prefunding scheme and the initial prefunding 
payments made in 1999 and 2000 are described. There is also a 
discussion of a number of issues arising from this policy 
initiative.         
 
The Social Welfare Reserve Fund and the Public Service 
Pensions Fund 
 
The Irish government decided in 1999 to initiate a policy 
of prefunding part of the future costs of social welfare and 
public service pensions by setting aside one per cent. of GNP 
annually for this purpose. The first annual contributions to the 
funds for both 1999 and 2000 were made on 1 December 1999. 
Two pension funds are being set up. The first fund is a 
Social Welfare Reserve Fund (SWRF) which, according to 
Eurostat accounting conventions, will be inside the General 
Government Sector, and will receive two-thirds of all 
contributions. The second fund is a  Public Service Pension 
Fund (PSPF) which, according to Eurostat accounting 
conventions, will fall outside the General Government sector and 
will be in receipt of the other one-third of all contributions. The 
impact of this accounting practice and the distribution of 
contributions between the two funds is that the annual 1 per 
cent. of GNP contribution will reduce the General Government 
balance by about one-third of 1 per cent. of GDP per annum.
6  
                                                                 
6    Care must be taken when switching between GNP and GDP bases in the 
case of the Irish economy since there is a substantial difference between 
these two measures due to exceptionally large Net Factors Income Flows   16
In 1999, the state telecommunications company, 
Telecom Eireann, was privatised with £3.7 bn. being received by 
the state from the shares sale. It was decided firstly to utilise 
£1.25 billion of the proceeds to discharge in  1999 existing 
pension liabilities arising in respect of employees and former 
employees in both Telecom Eireann and the State postal 
company, An Post. Because these liabilities arise to entities 
outside the General Government sector, the impact on the 1999 
General Government balance is to reduce it by 1.9 per cent. of 
GDP. The balance (£2.4 billion) of the privatisation receipts will 
be allocated to the two new pension funds in 2000 in the agreed 
two-thirds to one-third breakdown. This means that £0.8 billion 
will be allocated to the PSPF which will have the effect of 
reducing the General Government balance by about 1.1 per cent. 
of GDP in 2000. 
A further tranche of funds will arise from the Telecom 
Eireann privatisation in 2000 and will be distributed to the two 
Funds in the two-thirds to one-third ratio. This will reduce the 
General Government balance by a further 0.5 per cent. in 2000. 
The full impact, therefore, of using Telecom privatisation 
receipts for prefunding public sector pensions is to reduce it by 
1.9 per cent. of GDP in 1999 and by 1.6 per cent. in 2000. The 
privatisation allocation to the PSPF in 2000 will be added to by 
the first two annual contributions of one-third of one per cent. 
of GNP (for the years 1999 and 2000) being put into that Fund 
during 2000. Accordingly, the total payments to the PSPF will 
reduce the General Government balance by 2.2 per cent. in 2000 
(see Table 3 for the impact of these measures on the 1999 and 
2000 General Government Balance).  
Substantive legislation required for the establishment of 
the two funds is not yet in place. The amounts being allocated 
from the Telecom Eireann privatisation proceeds for prefunding 
purposes and the initial regular contributions to the Funds are 
being held in a Temporary Holding Fund (established in 
December 1999) until the substantive legislation is enacted. 
Among the issues to be addressed in drawing up that legislation 
is the need to ensure that the Funds are “ring-fenced” in the 
sense that monies in the Funds can be utilised solely for meeting 
the future pension outlays for which they are intended; at what 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
arising from the openness of the economy and high levels of direct foreign 
investment.   17
time in the future and in what manner will drawdowns from the 
Funds to meet pension costs commence; who will manage and 
control the Funds; and what investment mandate is to be 
followed by the managing authority.  
Accounting Issues and the Stability and Growth Pact  
 
Table 3 illustrates that, within ESA95 general government 
accounting practice, payments to the SWRF will have no impact 
on the General Government budget balance because that fund is 
within the General Government sector. In contrast, the PSPF is, 
under ESA95, outside the General Government sector so that 
payments by government to that fund reduce the General 
Government budget balance. 
   18
 
Table 3.  The Impact of Pensions Prefunding and Once off 
Pensions Costs  on the General Government Balance 
(GGB) 
  Impact on 
1999 GGB 
(% of GDP) 
Impact on 
2000 GGB 
(% of GDP) 
Payment of Telecom Eireann and 
An Post Pensions liability from 





Payment to SWRF of Telecom 
privatisation proceeds 
 
  No Impact 
Payment to PSPF of Telecom 
privatisation proceeds 
 
  -1.6 
Payment to SWRF of regular 2/3 
of 1 percent of GNP allotment 
for 1999 and 2000 
 
  No impact 
Payment to PSPF of regular 1/3 
of 1 per cent of GNP allotment 
for 1999 and 2000 
   -0.6 
 






Source: Stability Programme December 1999 Update. 
 
 
This feature of ESA95 is particularly interesting in the 
context of EU member states’ need to adhere to the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The Treaty requires 
that “Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits” 
(Article 104c). Compliance with Article 104c requires that the 
General Government deficit does not exceed 3 per cent. of GDP 
and that the General Government debt does not exceed 60 per 
cent. of GDP. The Pact was adopted in 1997. It clarifies and 
strengthens the Treaty’s fiscal requirements. In particular, 
member states are required to adhere to the medium-term 
objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. 
The emerging view is that, in practice, this provision will require 
that member states’ structural budget balances do not fall below 
a level that ensures that the actual General Government budget   19
balance will not exceed the 3 per cent. Treaty deficit limit in 
normal economic circumstances. 
The ESA95 statistical standard is used to assess fiscal 
performance in the EU member states. As illustrated above, a 
payment to a pension fund outside the General Government 
sector reduces the General Government budget balance. Since it 
constitutes a discretionary policy action, it will also reduce the 
structural budget balance. Payments to a pension fund like the 
PSPF, therefore, imply that, all other things being equal, there is 
a greater possibility of an excessive deficit arising in the medium 
term and the member state being found to be in violation of its 
Treaty and Pact commitments. The Pact accounting rules, 
therefore, seem to provide a disincentive insofar as member 
states may wish to prefund their future public service pension 
outgoings but are penalised under the Pact for doing so. 
Payments to both Funds also occur at the expense of a reduced 
pay-off of gross government debt. For member states, 
therefore, whose structural budget balance is not yet at or just at 
the close to balance level required by the Pact and/or whose 
gross debt is close to or in excess of 60 per cent. of GDP, there 
appears to be no incentive within the EU fiscal code to initiate 
prefunding. 
The use of privatisation receipts for prefunding of public 
sector pensions is also discouraged within the Pact framework. 
This is because in ESA95 privatisation receipts are not counted 
as General Government revenue but their use as a pre-funding 
contribution to future public service pension outlays increases 
General Government expenditure with a consequent decline in 
the General Government budget balance. Privatisation of state-
owned companies is being promoted by many EU governments 
as a means of improving their efficiency and competitiveness in 
increasingly globalised markets. What might be considered a 
prudent application of privatisation receipts over the next few 
years  - using them to reduce future public service pension 
liabilities  - may, however, be less desirable in a fiscal 
environment governed by the Treaty and the Pact, given the 
negative impact the overall transaction has on the General 
Government budget balance. 
 
Political Economy Considerations of Prefunding Initiatives 
   20
One of the immediate effects of the decision to set up 
the regular payments to the two Funds and to use the Telecom 
Eireann privatisation receipts for prefunding purposes was that 
the General Government surplus in 1999 and 2000 is being 
reduced by about 2 per cent. in both years. A potential benefit is 
that with there now being lower recorded budget surpluses the 
government might be in a position to argue that there is less 
scope available at this time for increases in current expenditure 
or reductions in tax rates. Although this argument would suggest 
that the public is myopic (in the sense that it does not see the 
positive impact that pre-funding has on the long-term fiscal 
position),  the government can at least point to the fall in the 
structural budget surplus as a result of the prefunding and the 
Pact requirement of budgetary positions close to balance or in 
surplus as a basis for resisting demands for expenditure 
increases or tax cuts. This is one benefit of the Pact framework: 
it means that member states whose structural budget balance is 
significantly better than the close to balance or in surplus level 
can use prefunding (which has no direct impact on domestic 
demand) to eliminate pressures for spending the “excess” 
structural budget balance in other ways.
 7      
Beyond the Pact-related considerations, a  more long-
term benefit is that the Funds specifically target meeting the 
prospective increases in government pensions bills in the future 
(the government has signalled its intention to “ring-fence” the 
Funds to ensure that they cannot be utilised for any  other 
expenditure purpose in the future). Promoting the reduction of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio as a basis (through lower future debt 
servicing costs) for meeting future increases in government 
pensions outlays may lead to a debt reduction policy being 
initially accepted by both the public and politicians. There is 
always a danger, however, that the savings on debt servicing will 
be utilised prior to or during the onset of a “pensions 
timebomb” for other purposes such as increased current 
expenditure or tax reductions for short-term political gain. While 
                                                                 
7    In the Stability Programme Update, the Department of Finance estimates 
that the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (exclusive of the prefunding 
payments) will be of the magnitude of 2.4 to 3 per cent. of GDP in the years 
2000 to 2002. This indicates that the structural budget balance is well inside 
the 0.9 per cent. deficit estimated by the European Commission as the 
minimum required for Ireland for compliance with the close to balance 
provision of the Pact.   21
there is no guarantee either that a “prefunding dividend” would 
not lead to similar actions, the prefunding’s specific focus on 
meeting future pension payments would likely mean that there 
will be less pressure to spend the dividend in other areas.  
One possible downside to the adoption of the 
prefunding policy is that the initiation of the Funds could 
engender a lack of urgency in the need for more fundamental 
pensions reform in Ireland. It might induce individuals to be 
more complacent with regard to managing their own private 
pension plans. Another important consideration relates to the 
political economy implications of an ageing population. An 
ageing electorate could be expected to increase the political 
pressure for increases in social welfare pension rates and for 
improvements in the terms of public sector pensions. This 
political pressure (given the demographic projections) might well 
become substantial at a time when the PSPF and the SWRF 
have grown to substantial levels (for example, to the overall 26 
per cent. of GNP level in 2020 in the LTIG scenario). A lobby 
for increased pension rates might argue that since these funds 
safeguard a minimum level of pension payments there is always 
scope for further pension rate increases.            
 
Investment Strategies for the Funds 
 
Both the regular 1 per cent. of GNP allocations for 1999 
and 2000 and the receipt of the bulk of the Telecom Eireann 
privatisation receipts will imply that the two Funds will have 
received resources for investment of about £5 billion, some 6.6 
per cent. of GDP, by end-2000. Based on the LTIG estimates 
(which does not allow for the impact of the Telecom Eireann 
privatisation allotment in 1999 and 2000 or include provision for 
any other possible future one-off payments to the Fund),  the 
Funds would have a capital value of over 20 per cent. of GNP 
by 2020. The investment strategy for these Funds is, therefore, a 
very important consideration. 
The investment decision-making criteria can be assessed 
along a number of lines. First, there is the decision whether to 
invest funds in public or private projects. The number of Irish 
public projects that would generate future revenues would 
appear quite limited. There is, as exemplified in the Telecom 
Eireann privatisation, a movement away from state ownership of   22
commercial enterprises in Ireland (as is also the case in many 
other countries). Non-commercial state enterprises do not offer 
the prospect of generating future dividends and there is little 
tradition of charging for the use of certain public goods in 
Ireland (for example, there are few toll roads in Ireland); there is, 
consequently, little expectation of those activities generating 
competitive returns, at least in the short-to-medium term. 
If investment in private capital markets, therefore, seems 
to be the more viable consideration for the Funds’ managers, 
the question arises as to how the investment strategy should be 
weighted between investing in the domestic Irish capital market 
or in foreign c apital markets. Besides the normal investment 
considerations (for example, the risk-return tradeoffs available), 
the impact of investing in the domestic capital market needs 
special consideration. The Irish equity market is small with a  
capitalised value o f £108 billion (at end-1999). As mentioned 
above, the two Funds will have about £5 billion for investment 
by end-2000. Investment of large tranches of the Funds in the 
domestic stock market could have significant consequences. In 
particular, such large-scale buying could lead to a substantial 
rise in the overall stock market value that might be unwarranted 
from an economic perspective.  
The initial investment of a large part or all of the £5 
billion being alloted to the Funds in 1999 and 2000 in the 
domestic stock market might add, via a wealth effect, a 
significant stimulus to domestic demand that would be untimely 
given the signs of overheating already visible at this time in the 
Irish economy. Concerns have also been expressed that large-
scale investment  in domestic stocks could lead to effective 
nationalisation of much of Irish industry with negative 
consequences for the long-run performance of the affected 
companies and thereof for the return to the Funds investment 
(see, for example, Davis (1999)). Lane (1999) advocates 
investing largely in overseas assets as a sensible hedge, to 
improve the liquidity of the investment portfolio, and to avoid 
politicisation problems.    23
 
4. Fiscal Sustainability in Fast-Growing and Catching-Up 
Economies 
This section examines the role economic growth plays in 
the long-run evolution of the public finances and the 
sustainability of the public finances. The notion of fiscal 
sustainability embraced in the Maastricht Treaty links fiscal 
variables and national income, with public finances being 
regarded as sustainable when the General Government deficit-to-
GDP ratio is below 3 per cent. and the General Government 
debt-to-GDP ratio is below 60 per cent.  
The role of investment in economic growth theory also 
deserves consideration. Government investment, particularly in 
the area of public goods provision, may be very important in 
fast-growing, catching-up economies. In spite of its possible 
strong role in consolidating and maintaining economic growth, 
government investment is not distinguished from other 
government expenditure items in meeting the basic requirements 
of the Maastricht and Pact fiscal codes. 
Sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2 review the facets of the 
economic growth literature with particular relevance to fiscal 
sustainability issues. In sub-section 4.1, the arithmetic of fiscal 
sustainability underlying the Treaty’s requirements is 
considered. The importance of the rate of economic growth and 
its relationship to the rate of interest in examining fiscal 
sustainability issues is highlighted. In sub-section 4.2, there is a 
discussion of the critical role of the relationship between the 
interest rate and the growth rate and between savings and 
investment in standard neoclassical growth theory. The 
distinction between short run and long run equilibria in 
neoclassical growth theory is also highlighted. 
In sub-section 4.3, the implications of this review for the 
fiscal rules that have been adopted in EMU are considered. It is 
argued that the rules may prove over-imposing on fast-growing, 
catching-up economies, in particular by restricting government 
investment.    24
4.1 The Arithmetic of Fiscal Sustainability 
The Domar Framework 
 
The predominant analytical framework used to assess 
fiscal sustainability is based on the intertemporal budget 
dynamics introduced by Domar in the 1940s. This arithmetic of 
sustainability is centred around the relationship between 
government budget balances and debt levels. This framework 
provides the threshold figures of 3 per cent. and 60 per cent. of 
GDP for government deficits and debt, respectively, that 
underlie the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
Albert Einstein is credited with the remark  “that 
everything should be made as simple as possible but not 
simpler”. The conditions for the sustainability of fiscal policy 
are presented quite simply in the Domar framework. Expressing 
the government budget constraint as follows: 
D = G - T = DB + DM 
where  D is the government deficit 
  G is government expenditure 
  B is government debt 
  T is tax receipts 
  M is the money supply 
 
The budget deficit can be financed by issuing money 
DM or by issuing government debt through bonds DB. Under 
EMU, no monetary financing is allowed so DM = 0 such that D 
= DB. Expressing each as a percentage of GDP (Y) we get the 
deficit to GDP (d = D/Y) and the debt to GDP (b = B/Y) ratios. 
Using the latter we get B = b.Y. To get the change in the debt 
(DB) we can use total differentiation, or in this case the product 
rule of differentiation, to get 
DB = b.DY + Y.Db 
Divide both sides by GDP (Y) 
DB/Y = b.(DY/Y) + Y/Y.Db 
DB/Y = b.g + Db 
where g = DY/Y is the NOMINAL growth rate of GDP.   25
 
Using the fact that DB = D, then DB/Y is D/Y = d. The 
debt sustainability rule in this simple framework is  
Db = d - b.g 
Fiscal policy is defined to be sustainable in this context 
if it leads to a stable or decreasing government debt ratio over 
time. In order to stabilise the debt ratio (not necessarily the level 
of debt) we should set  
Db = 0 = d - b.g 
d = b.g 
This implies a very simple rule for sustainability that the 
deficit to GDP ratio must equal the nominal growth of GDP 
times the debt to GDP ratio. With this neat rule the Maastricht 
convergence ratios can be inserted such that d = 0.03 and b 
=0.6. The nominal growth rate of GDP consistent with these 
ratios is 5 per cent. (g = 0.03/0.6 = 0.05). This rule highlights in 
a simple way the importance of nominal output growth for debt 
dynamics.  
 
Fiscal Sustainability and the Relationship between the Rate of 
Interest and the Rate of Growth  
 
While this representation illustrates the role of economic 
growth in assessing fiscal sustainability, a more useful 
representation, with a richer economic interpretation, separates 
out interest payments on the debt from the budget balance, 
leaving a primary budget balance. Let P denote the primary 
balance such that 
P = G -T  
where  
D = P + i.B 
Dividing by GDP (Y) to express as a ratio 
d = p + i.b 
From earlier we have   26
d = Db + b.g 
such that 
Db = p + i.b - b.g 
The sustainability rule now is 
Db = 0 =  p + (i - g).b 
or  
- p = (i - g).b 
In this representation, the requirements for fiscal 
sustainability depends on the rate of interest (or the 
intertemporal price) and the rate of growth such that: 
•If i > g then p < 0 (primary surpluses) required;  
•If i < g then p > 0 possible in medium term but not 
sustainable in the long term.  
This formulation can be used with both growth and 
interest rates in real or nominal terms as long as they are 
consistently applied. While this representation enhances the 
basic Domar framework, it may still be too simple. The 
dynamics involved are obviously much more complex and the 
cyclical position of the economy is important for sensibly 
interpreting such rules.
8 However, this simple framework 
highlights the importance of the relationship between the 
economy’s interest rate and growth rate for fiscal sustainability. 
4.2 Economic Growth Theory and Fiscal Sustainability 
The Golden Rule 
 
The relationship between the interest rate and growth rate 
is also critical within standard neoclassical growth theory. 
Neoclassical growth theory states that an economy is 
dynamically efficient when it follows the so-called “golden 
                                                                 
8  The dynamics can be much richer using difference equations as in Marin 
(1999) or with differential equations as in Kinnunen and Kuoppamaki 
(1998).   27
rule”.
9 This golden rule determines how much capital stock is 
required to ensure that each generation has a constant, or 
sustainable level, of per capita consumption. The precise 
conditions of the golden rule depends upon the model of the 
economy used and its treatment of investment and savings.   
A simple version of the golden rule based on a growth 
model with a constant savings rate (described as the Swan-
Solow model) is that the marginal productivity of capital (MPK) 
at the golden rule level of capital stock (K
G) equals the effective 
depreciation rate for the capital/labour ratio. This effective 
depreciation rate is equal to the rate of capital depreciation (d) 
and the rate of growth in the labour force or population (n).  
This condition (MPK(K
G) = d + n) keeps the economy at its 
steady state or l ong run equilibrium growth rate.
10 The intuition 
is that capital must grow at a rate that matches both the growth 
in the labour supply factor, in order to keep the capital/labour 
ratio constant, and the rate of depreciation, in order to account 
for the decay in the capital stock that naturally occurs over time.  
 
Savings and Investment 
 
In the 1940s economic growth debate, Domar, along 
with Harrod (although working independently of each other), 
attempted to integrate the implications of full employment with 
elements of economic growth in response to the Keynesian 
revolution.  
The Harrod-Domar growth model has only one sector 
with three elements  - exogenously determined labour supply 
growing at a given rate g L; a production function converting 
capital and labour input into output and a savings and 
investment relationship. They derived two fundamental 
conditions that need to be satisfied to ensure long-term full 
employment. The first condition was that the economy must 
                                                                 
9    Phelps christened the “golden rule” with its biblical connotation of “do unto 
others as you would have others do unto you”. 
10   While in principle the long run equilibrium can follow a path that is quite 
irregular, issues of tractability and simplicity have led to attention being 
confined to the steady-state, that is where the various quantities grow at 
constant rates. Ironically this is why the neoclassical growth theory is not 
really a theory of growth at all.   28
invest the full employment level of savings every year, or else if 
investment is short of this level, demand will be insufficient for 
full employment.  The second condition was that the rate of 
growth of output must equal the growth of the labour force plus 
the rate of increase in labour productivity. 
For this equilibrium growth to hold it is necessary that 
the labour force and the capital stock be fully employed. The 
level of investment is associated with the level of output but also 
with the rate of growth of output through changes in the capital 
stock.  To maintain the full employment capital stock, output 
must grow at a rate equal to what Harrod described as t he 
“warranted” rate. This warranted rate was equal to the constant 
savings from output rate (s) divided by the coefficient for capital 





On the labour side the condition is that output growth 
should equal the growth in the labour force (gL) plus the 
productivity growth (l).  Therefore 
g gL = + l  




L = + = l  
This is a “knife-edge” condition. If it is violated, either 
excess capital or unemployed labour results which leads to 
instability in the model.  This results in oscillations around the 
steady state path.   However, this instability results from the 
overdetermination of the model with its initial assumptions of 
constant capital/labour, capital/output ratios etc.. These rigidities 
can be removed by allowing for less specific production 
functions that allow for more realistic input substitutability and 
savings rates that are determined by profits and incomes that 
derived from the growth process. These extensions are carried 
out in the neoclassical growth model of Swan-Solow and so on. 
 
Modern Growth Theory and the Modified Golden Rule 
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p.10) state in their widely 
acclaimed text that  “between Ramsey and the late 1950s, 
Harrod and Domar attempted to integrate Keynesian analysis 
with elements of economic growth. They used production 
functions with little substitutability among the inputs to argue 
that the capitalist system is inherently unstable. Since they 
wrote during or immediately after the Great Depression, these 
arguments were received sympathetically by many economists. 
Although these contributions triggered a good deal of research 
at the time, very little of this analysis plays a role in today’s 
thinking”. 
More modern neoclassical growth models endogenise 
savings rather than assuming them to be a constant fraction of 
income. This is done on the basis of optimising choices made 
by households. In order to handle this optimisation it is 
necessary to assume either a “representative agent” that is 
infinitely long lived or else consider an economy of “overlapping 
generations”. These Ramsey-type growth models with consumer 
optimisation state that the golden rule level of the capital stock 
occurs where the interest rate (i) equals the steady state growth 
of output (g).
11 The interest rate is equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital less the rate of capital depreciation 
(MPK(K
G)  - d). This equality depends upon an assumption of 
competitive firms, so it is important to note that perfectly 
competitive markets and constant returns to scale are 
assumptions of these type of growth model. The steady state 
growth rate is equal to the rate of technical progress (x) plus the 
rate of population growth (n). Therefore, in these models, the 
golden rule is 
i = MPK(K*) - d = n + x = g 
i  = g 
While this a simple condition, it may be too simple. This 
model can lead to too much savings. A modification to this 
condition is where the real interest rate equals the effective 
discount rate. The intuition here is the usual rationale given for 
discounting future values. The social rate of time preference, 
reflected by the effective discount rate, is equal to the social 
                                                                 
11    These long run growth models deal only in real terms so that the interest 
rate (i) throughout this section is the real interest rate along with real growth 
rates of output (g).   30
opportunity cost of capital, reflected by the interest rate. 
However, again the interest rate will typically only equal the 
discount rate under the quite restrictive assumptions of perfectly 
operating capital markets, no capital taxes and so on. The 
“modified golden rule” is 
i*= MPK(K*) - d = r + qx  
where  r is the rate of time preference and  q is the 
intertemporal substitutability of consumption, such that qx term 
is the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. This modified 
golden rule overcomes the dynamic inefficiency problem of 
oversaving that arises in the simpler model because the 
households optimise and being infinitely lived as in the 
representative agent model or interacting with future generations 
as in the overlapping generations model they will not be myopic. 
The lower optimal savings imply that the modified steady state 
golden rule capital stock K* < K
G. The intuition here is that the 
optimising household does not save enough to attain the golden 
rule capital stock because their i mpatience, reflected in the 
effective discount rate, does not make worthwhile sacrificing 
more current consumption for higher steady state consumption. 
Here another key assumption of these models becomes vital, 
that is diminishing returns to capital such that MPK (K*) > MPK 
(K
G). Therefore  
i* = MPK(K*) - d > MPK(K
G) - d = i 
i* = r + qx > n + x = i 
i* > g = i 
This modification therefore suggests that the equality of 
the growth rate (g) and the interest rate (i) may have no general 
applicability outside the growth model with constant savings. 
 
Short Run and Long Run Equilibria 
 
There are two kinds of equilibria in neoclassical growth 
theory that need to be distinguished. One is the short run, or 
momentary, equilibrium where the population, capital stock and 
technical know-how are fixed. The other is the long  run 
equilibrium where all of the production factors can grow. The 
long run equilibrium, or steady state, implies momentary   31
equilbria for all dates. However, a series of momentary equilibria 
are not necessarily a long run equilibrium.  For momentary 
equilibria to constitute a long run equilibrium there must be a 
rational expectations, or dynamically efficient, equilibrium. This 
dynamically efficient outcome requires that the actions of agents 
taken on a given date, based on their expectations of future 
dates, is still consistent when these future dates arrive.
12  
These are important distinctions. If the momentary 
outcome is dynamically inefficient then the economy is not on 
its long run equilibrium path. If the economy is not on its long 
run growth path the conditions for dynamic consistency may no 
longer be desirable. This is the same intuition as the “theory of 
the second best”. Indeed, as seen above, many of the 
assumptions used in the growth theory, such as constant returns 
and perfectly competitive markets, are those invoked by the 
“fundamental welfare theorems”.
13 The theory of the second 
best says that in the absence of being able to attain all the 
conditions necessary for the existence of Pareto efficient 
equilibrium the second best position is not necessarily the one in 
which the remaining conditions will hold. As Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996, p.172) point out, “the behaviour of dynamically 
inefficient economies wreaks havoc with much of our intuition 
about the laws of economics”. 
4.3 Implications for Fast-Growing and Catching-Up 
Economies 
Economies in Transition 
 
In the current circumstances, with the growth rate 
exceeding the interest rate, the long run dynamic efficiency 
conditions for steady state growth are not being met in Ireland. 
This in itself, however, does not give any clear indication 
                                                                 
12   In the context of fiscal policy, such dynamic efficiency arguments are tied up 
with the Ricardian Equivalence theorem. It is interesting to note that the fiscal 
performance of the Irish economy in the late 1980s has been offered as an 
example of “expansionary fiscal contractions” based on a version of the 
Ricardian Equivalence theorem. 
13  The first fundamental welfare theorem is that all competitive equilibrium 
outcomes are Pareto efficient while the second fundamental welfare theorem 
is that all Pareto efficient outcomes can be derived from competitive 
equilibria if there are suitable lump sum transfers available.   32
whether it would be better for interest rates to at least equate 
with the growth rate in the short term. It may be that the Irish 
economy is not on its equilibrium path but is in a transitional 
phase, moving towards a  higher sustainable growth path. This 
might justify the current interest rate - growth rate relationship.    
Although the evidence is mixed, a view held in growth 
economics is that poorer countries tend to grow faster than 
richer countries and thereby eventually converge in living 
standards with those richer countries. Once this convergence is 
achieved a slowdown in growth rates occurs.  For countries 
starting from a relatively low base, convergence over time to 
slower-growing, richer countries would be expected given the 
openness to foreign direct investment, technology, trade and 
financial flows. There is evidence of this convergence occurring 
for Ireland, for example, as it quickly approaches the EU 
average standard of living. Within this growth context, the Irish 
economy can be seen to be in an exceptional growth phase as it 
moves onto another growth path. The economy can be 
expected to slow down once it reaches a new steady state path. 
Factors that can be expected to slow economic growth over the 
coming  decades include the elimination of economic slack, 
physical congestion constraint, slowdown in population growth, 
convergence achievement, achieving a steady state skills level, 
and reaching environmental sustainability limits.  
While Ireland is the classic example of an economy 
currently experiencing high economic growth rates in the EU, 
there is a wide range of growth rates and stage of development 
experiences across the EU at present. A dichotomy between 
mature economies and fast-growing, catching-up economies 
may become more clearcut if there is an accession of eastern 
and southern European countries into the EU in the future. It is 
important in this context to assess whether the commonly-
applied EU fiscal rules, provided by the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact, will cater successfully for the 
diversity of investment and public finance considerations that is 
becoming more evident in the EU.     
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Government Investment, Debt Reduction, and the Treaty and 
Pact Fiscal Rules  
 
The lesson f rom the quick pass-through of traditional 
economic growth theory in the previous sub-sections suggests 
that sustainability rules involving interest rates and growth rates 
need to take account of the stage of development of the 
economy. It also points to the need for an economy that is 
experiencing a rapidly growing labour force to acquire greater 
capital and infrastructure provision to return to an equilibrium 
growth path. An infrastructure deficit, as is recognised to exist 
in Ireland at present (see Appendix 1), may justify increased 
investment to bring the economy onto an equilibrium growth 
path.  
Government may need to play a key direct role in the 
investment process, particularly in the provision of 
infrastructure. In this respect, the Irish government has in recent 
years increased significantly its investment programme and has 
committed itself to increase the level of investment per annum 
over the medium term in the National Development Plan 2000-
2006 (NDP) (see Appendix 2 for further details).  
The economic growth literature and experience, 
therefore, may point to the need for a comparatively high level 
of government investment while economies are in transition. The 
difficulty is that the fiscal requirements of the Treaty and the 
Pact, however, may limit the scope for increased government 
investment at a time when it is needed to eliminate infrastructure 
and capital deficiencies that hinder long-term growth prospects.  
The Treaty and the Pact impose practical constraints on 
the level of government investment and do not differentiate 
between the varying growth rates across member states and the 
different current debt positions of member state governments. 
From a monetary policy and demand management perspective, 
this is understandable as imposing a uniform, low deficit limit 
ensures that member states’ fiscal policies are each 
complementing the single monetary policy. The imposition of a 
uniform deficit limit may be open to criticism, however, on two 
grounds, both with particular relevance to developing EU 
economies.  
First, from a pure fiscal sustainability perspective, 
uniform requirements of a 3 per cent. deficit limit and budgetary   34
positions close to balance or in surplus may make less sense 
when viewed from the varying stages of economic development 
across member states. The Treaty’s 3 per cent. deficit limit, for 
example, may be unnecessarily restrictive for ensuring fiscal 
sustainability in economies where nominal growth rates exceed 5 
per cent. (as illustrated in Appendix 3). Achieving a budget 
balance that averages close to zero or in surplus over the 
economic cycle, as specified in the Pact, would  be more 
restrictive again than what is required for a sustainable debt 
level. For fast-growing economies, therefore, the EU fiscal 
criteria may impose deficit requirements that go beyond what is 
required to achieve sustainable debt positions. 
Secondly, the Treaty and Pact rules may restrict 
government investment within EU member states. All other 
things being equal, increased government investment reduces the 
structural budget balance and, consequently, increases the 
possibility of the member state concerned being found to be in 
violation of the Pact requirement of having a structural budget 
position close to balance or in surplus. If a member state is 
struggling to meet the close to balance requirement, either in the 
future or more immediately
14, reducing government investment 
before increasing taxes or reducing current expenditure may be a 
comparatively easy political option but would occur at a greater 
cost to the long-term development of the economy.  
A reduction in government investment may be less 
critical in mature economies with an already well-developed 
infrastructure and where an improved primary balance may be of 
critical importance, either to reduce high debt ratios or to meet 
imminent increases in ageing-related expenditures. For other 
member states with comparatively low debt levels and 
favourable demographic prospects but a poor and increasingly 
restrictive infrastructure, an improvement in the structural budget 
balance to the close to balance level may make little sense from 
either a fiscal sustainability or a long-term economic growth 
point of view. Fast-growing economies may even be in a 
position to run budget deficits in excess of the 3 per cent. 
Treaty limit for investment purposes while still reducing their 
debt-to-GDP ratio.  In this context, where some economies can 
                                                                 
14   According to the Opinion of the Monetary Committee (MC/II/482-98-
final), which was endorsed by the Ecofin Council, the requirement should be 
met by no later than 2002.   35
achieve declining debt-to-GDP values with deficits in excess of 
3 per cent. and are also those in need of a significant increase in 
government investment, there are some grounds for considering 
allowing the government deficit to exceed the 3 per cent. limit 
for investment purposes. This stresses the need to examine the 
appropriateness and feasibility of fiscal “golden rules” in 
EMU.
15   
To sum up, the economic growth literature suggests that 
there may be some justification for an economy that has under-
utilised resources, underdeveloped capital or deficient 
infrastructure running larger budget deficits for investment 
purposes than other countries. Fiscal rules designed to aid 
short-term macroeconomic management, however, may impede 
government investment programmes. With the existing EU 
member states having different medium-to-long term growth rate 
prospects and such differences across the EU likely to be 
accentuated if there is an accession of new member states in the 
future, it is important that the implications of the Treaty and Pact 
fiscal rules for long-term economic growth are more closely 
examined. 
5. Conclusion 
With a favourable demographic profile in prospect for 
many years to come, the expectation of only a gradual 
unwinding of output growth rates from current very high levels, 
and a budget balance currently in surplus and gross government 
debt under 60 per cent. of GDP and falling, Ireland would seem 
to be an economy with time on its side before any concerns 
about fiscal sustainability might arise.  
In this paper, however, it has been argued that even in 
economies with time on their side policy-makers must address 
important issues in assessing how best to manage benign fiscal 
prospects. They have to assess the pros and cons of reducing 
the government debt against  prefunding state pension liabilities, 
for instance. They may also have to assess whether a large 
increase in government investment would be appropriate. This is 
because while a fast-growing economy can provide an 
environment for favourable fiscal outturns, it can also highlight 
                                                                 
15   See Buti and Sapir (1998) and Balassone and Franco (2000) for 
discussions in this area.   36
infrastructure deficiencies, particularly in a converging economy, 
that threaten to retard long-term growth prospects.  
The paper has also pointed to how long-term fiscal 
decision-making in EU member states has been made more 
complex by the Treaty and Pact rules governing fiscal behaviour 
in the EU. These rules and General Government accounting 
practice appear to provide a disincentive against prefunding 
schemes. Furthermore, the rules may limit the attainment of the 
optimal growth path of an economy and may restrict 
government investment policy, particularly in economies where 
significant government investment may be warranted. Assessing 
how EU fiscal rules could be reformed to overcome these 
difficulties seems like a topic worthy of immediate consideration 
by policy analysts and academics alike.   37
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Appendix 1.  The Irish Infrastructure Deficit 
Some Indicators of the Infrastructure Deficit 
 
The relatively high rate of economic growth in Ireland in 
recent years has seen per capita Irish income levels rapidly 
converging on the average EU level. This growth has coincided 
with a large increase in the number of employed persons from 
1,220,000 in 1994 to 1,669,000 in 1999 (CSO, 2000). One of the 
issues highlighted and exacerbated by these developments is 
Ireland’s infrastructure deficit in an international context. While 
Ireland’s competitiveness ranking in many key areas (see Table 
4), is quite impressive in both an international and EU context, 
Ireland’s competitiveness ranking for infrastructure is quite 
poor.  
Table 4.  Ireland’s Competitiveness Rankings 1999 
  Among 46 Countries  Among EU 
     
Overall  11  6 
Domestic Economy  2  1 
Internationalisation  8  4 
Government  5  1 
Finance  16  10 
Infrastructure  23  12 
Management  7  4 
Science  11  7 
People  21  9 
Source: IMD (1999). 
To illustrate its infrastructure deficiency in key areas, 
some indicators of Ireland’s road infrastructure provision are 
given in Table 5. Ireland’s road network provision appears on 
first viewing to be quite satisfactory. Both the density of road 
network and population per kilometre of road network compare 
reasonably in an EU context. As Table 5 i llustrates, however, 
Ireland has a quite poor motorway provision. The pick-up in 
both commercial and non-commercial traffic has put the existing 
road infrastructure under considerable strain.
16  
                                                                 
16   The total number of motor vehicles (commercial and non-commercial) under 
current licence in Ireland rose from 1,151,000 in 1993 to 1,510,000 in 1998 
(Department of Environment, 1999).   40
The pressures in road transport are being echoed in 
other transport areas. In terms of water transportation, Ireland 
ranks 14th of the 15 EU member states in the IMD (1999) 
indicator of water transportation efficiency. This ranking arises 
in a context where, for example, the total tonnage of goods 
handled by Irish ports has risen from 27 million tonnes in 1992 
to 40 million tonnes in 1998 (CSO, 1999). Outside the transport 
sphere, IBEC (1998) and the National Competitiveness Council 
(1999) also point to substantial infrastructure needs in Ireland in 
the environment, e nergy, telecommunications, and education, 
science and technology areas. 
 
Table 5.  Road Infrastructure in Ireland 




of roads/  
km
2 of area) 
Population 




as a % of  
Total Road 
Network 
       
Ireland  1.3  39  0.1 
Belgium  4.6  71  1.2 
Denmark  1.7  73  1.1 
France  1.8  60  0.8 
Germany  1.8  127  1.7 
Greece  0.9  90  0.2 
Italy  2.7  70  0.8 
Luxembourg  1.7  80  2.0 
Netherlands  2.5  148  2.1 
Portugal  0.8  138  0.8 
Spain  0.3  229  4.4 
UK  1.6  150  0.8 
Austria  1.3  75  1.5 
Finland  0.2  65  0.5 
Sweden  0.3  66  0.8 
       
Source: IBEC (1998)  
 
Ireland’s infrastructure deficit, therefore, is being 
increasingly highlighted in recent years as rapid economic 
growth and inward migration have put considerable pressure on 
the existing infrastructure, in particular transport infrastructure. 
As a number of recent reports have pointed out, this increased   41
congestion threatens to lead to significant infrastructure 
bottlenecks emerging unless addressed by rapid, major 
investment.
17 
“The impact of this serious structural deficit can be 
clearly seen in the spatial distribution of industry, and 
particularly foreign industry, in Ireland. The absence of road 
links of sufficient quality to allow speedy transportation of 
goods and persons between major p opulation centres and 
air/seaports has led to a huge concentration of industry in and 
around Dublin. This in turn is having serious consequences in 
terms of congestion, leading to heavy demands on all public 
services, with public transport, the road network, and 
environmental infrastructure coming under particular 
pressure.” (IBEC, 1998, pp.9-10) 
It seems that Ireland’s infrastructure deficit could hinder 
Irish economic growth prospects by acting as a direct constraint 
on industrial development, threatening Ireland’s attractiveness as 
a location for new investment, and reducing existing industry’s 
competitiveness on international markets. In a worst case 
scenario, a widening of the infrastructure deficit could threaten 
existing industry through forcing closure or relocation to another 
country. 
                                                                 
17   See, for example, Duffy et al. (1999) and IBEC (1998).   42
Appendix 2.  The National Development Plan, 2000-2006 
 
The recent National Development Plan (NDP) 
(Department of Finance, 1999) details a commitment to invest 
£21 billion (in 1999 prices) in economic and social infrastructure 
over the period 2000 to 2006. The NDP also allocates a further 
£11 billion to investment in employment and human resources 
and £9 billion to the productive sector, bringing total 
expenditure to £41 billion. Some £5 billion of funding will come 
from the EU and a minimum of £2 billion or so from Public 
Private Partnerships. The remaining £34 billion of funding will 
be provided by Irish government. The adoption of the NDP 
means that Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), will 
continue its considerable year-on-year increase of recent years in 
2000 and 2001 (see Table 6).    43
    
Table 6.   General Government Capital Formation, 1996-
2002   
Year       IR£   Year-on-Year            % of GDP 
       million      Increase 
 
1996       1,059           10.5       2.3 
1997       1,306           23.3       2.5   
1998       1,586           21.4       2.7 
1999       2,083           31.3       3.1 
2000       2,522           21.0       3.4   
2001       3,159           25.3       3.9 
2002       3,252             2.9       3.7 
Source: 1996-2000: 1 March 2000 E xcessive Deficit Notification, 
2001-2002: Stability Programme Update (1 December 1999) and 2000 
Budget material.   44
Appendix 3.  The EU Fiscal Rules’ Restrictive Arithmetic 
The EU sustainability requirement of a debt to GDP 
ratio, Db £  0, of 60 per cent or less can be attained with a deficit 
to GDP ratio in excess of 3 per cent when an economy has 
nominal GDP growth above 5 per cent. To illustrate this use can 
be made of the Domar debt sustainability condition: 
Db = d - b.g £ 0  
where b is debt to GDP ratio, d is the deficit to GDP 
ratio and g is the nominal growth rate. This arithmetic shows that 
the maximum 3 per cent. deficit allowed under the Treaty can 
prove unnecessarily restrictive for the attainment of a debt ratio 
of 60 per cent or less. For example, a converging economy with 
a potential real GDP growth rate of 5 per cent and a price 
deflator of 2 per cent. (implying 7 per cent. nominal GDP 
growth) could run a deficit of 4 per cent. and eventually stabilise 
at a debt to GDP ratio below 60 per cent. (b = d/g = 0.04/0.07 = 
0.57). Table 7 shows that at higher growth rates larger deficits 
are congruent with the attainment of debt ratios of 60 per cent. 





Table 7.  Debt to GDP Stabilisation Ratios (b =d/g) 
  d  3%  3.5%  4%  4.5%  5% 
g             
5.0%    60.0%  70.0%  80.0%  90.0%  100% 
5.5%    54.5%  63.6%  72.7%  81.8%  90.1% 
6.0%    50.0%  58.3%  66.6%  75.0%  83.3% 
6.5%    46.2%  53.9%  61.5%  69.2%  76.9% 
7.0%    42.8%  50.0%  57.1%  64.3%  71.4% 
7.5%    40.0%  46.6%  53.3%  60.0%  66.6% 
8.0%    37.5%  43.8%  50.0%  56.3%  62.5% 
 